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Abstract—This paper studies the medium access design for
secondary users (SUs) from a game-theoretic learning perspec-
tive. In consideration of the random return of primary users, a
distributed SU access approach is presented based on an adaptive
CSMA scheme, in which each SU accesses multiple idle frequency
slots of a licensed frequency band with adaptive activity factors.
The problem of finding optimal activity factors of SUs is
formulated as a potential game, and the existence, feasibility and
optimality of Nash Equilibrium (NE) are analyzed. Furthermore,
to achieve NEs of the formulated game, learning-based algorithms
are developed in which each SU independently adjusts its activity
factors. Convergence properties of best-response dynamics and
log-linear dynamics are studied. Subsequently, by learning other
SUs’ behavior from locally available information, the convergence
with probability 1 to an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the
globally optimal solution is investigated by both analysis and
simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In hierarchical cognitive radio networks, the design of an ef-
ficient distributed medium access scheme for secondary users
(SUs) is challenging due to the conflicts with licensed primary
users (PUs), and hence, has received considerable attention
[1]–[3]. When studying medium access design in a cognitive
radio network, a key concern is how to manage spectrum
sharing among SUs in a distributed manner. The simplicity,
success and coexistence capability of the listen-before-talk
random access scheme has the potential to be applied for
the early cognitive systems [4]. For instance, Carrier Sense
Multiple Access (CSMA) has been used in the literature
to randomly allocate channel times among competing SUs
(e.g., [5]–[7]). Furthermore, the new wireless standard IEEE
802.11af, which has been recently introduced to implement an
enhanced type of Wi-Fi using TV white spaces, will also use
a CSMA-based protocol for spectrum sharing [8]–[10].
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However, a random access scheme (e.g., CSMA) suffers
from low channel utilization because of inevitable contention
among users. To improve the efficiency, efforts have been
exerted on optimizing random access performance (e.g., [11],
[12]). Regarding IEEE 802.11 MAC operation, in [13], an
opportunistic CSMA (O-CSMA) scheme is proposed for a
WLAN to improve throughput by exploiting multi-user diver-
sity gain. The proposed O-CSMA adopts a channel-adaptive
back-off which prioritizes the users having high-SNR, and
hence, significantly improves throughput [13]. Then, [14] pro-
poses a multi-channel O-CSMA scheme in which high-SNR
channels are selected with higher probabilities for OFDMA
systems. By arranging transmission on favorable channels for
multiple users, the proposed O-CSMA reaches the full multi-
user diversity gain despite the distributed operation.
To offer an efficient CSMA scheme which could be com-
patible with requirements in a cognitive radio network, in
addition to channel conditions, PU activity characteristics
should be taken into consideration. Furthermore, it is im-
portant to perform fair resource allocation among SUs while
avoiding collision with PUs. Thus, a more cognitive random
access scheme is required to consider conflicts with PUs
and fairness among SUs. Accordingly, in [15], we present
an adaptive multi-channel CSMA scheme in which adaptive
access probabilities (called activity factor) are adopted for
SUs, taking into account PU return probabilities and spectrum
sharing incentives in addition to the channel quality functions.
Subsequently, the SU activity factor optimization problem
for maximizing the overall SU throughput is formulated and
medium access algorithms are developed for SUs.
In this paper1, the adaptive CSMA-based access design
for SUs is studied in a game-theoretic framework. There are
three key reasons for using a game-theoretic approach. First,
since game theory explicitly recognizes interactions among
autonomous SUs, it enables providing distributed algorithms.
Second, game-theoretic algorithms empower us to accelerate
the convergence in comparison with the algorithm proposed
in [15]. Third, game theory offers a useful tool to predict,
analyze and characterize the long-run behavior of the system,
specifically in comparison with the globally optimal solution.
In the proposed game-theoretic algorithm, activity factor se-
lections are made independently and dynamically by each SU,
which aims to satisfy its own demand despite imposed sharing
incentives. More specifically, the activity factor optimization
1Parts of the preliminary results of this work have been presented in [16]
2problem is formulated as an exact potential game. Via potential
game framework, it is proved that the formulated game admits
at least one pure-strategy NE, i.e., the stable operating point
of the system. Subsequently, the feasibility and efficiency of
NE are investigated. To address incomplete information about
the game structure, learning approaches–which can respond
optimally to the history information and achieve NE points–are
studied in terms of information requirements and convergence
properties. We establish the convergence of the best-response
iterations to a pure-strategy NE which is not essentially the
globally optimal solution.
Aiming to enable equilibrium selection, we introduce the
log-linear learning process which is basically a perturbed best-
response process. The log-linear learning is one of the few
learning approaches which assures convergence to the most
efficient NE which is globally optimal. By introducing noise
into decision making process, the log-linear iterations diverge
from the suboptimal NE while moving in the direction toward
the globally optimal NE which is robust to noisy perturbations
[17], [18].
Inspired by how the log-linear learning works, we propose a
fully-distributed algorithm following best-response dynamics
in which each SU adjusts its activity factors independently by
learning from locally available information. Taking advantage
of the noisy observations, it is shown that the best-response
iterations will finally stay in a neighborhood of the globally
optimal NE with probability of one. This can be explained
by the fact that the globally optimal NE of the formulated
game is the single stochastically stable NE. In comparison
with the learning-based algorithm in [15], the proposed game-
theoretic algorithm in this paper appears to have much faster
convergence.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we review the related work. Section III presents an overview
of the system model and introduces the activity factor opti-
mization problem. In Section IV, the medium access design
is formulated as an exact potential game. Then, the existence,
feasibility and efficiency of NE of the formulated game are
analyzed. Section V investigates the convergence properties
of learning approaches including the best-response dynamics
and the log-linear dynamics. Finally, Section VI presents the
concluding remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
There are several works in literature addressing distributed
medium access design in hierarchical cognitive radio networks
from non-game-theoretic and game-theoretic perspectives. In
[5], [6], [19]–[21], the problem of channel selection is studied,
assuming that both PUs and SUs have the same transmis-
sion time-slot structure. However, such an assumption of
synchronous slotted transmission structure between PU and
SU networks is not sensible since it needs well coordination
in time between PU and SU networks. In this paper, under
assumption of no time coordination between SUs and PUs,
we investigate medium access design for SUs in consideration
of possible collision between PU and SU due to PU return.
When studying access design under the effect of PU return,
most existing works considered a single SU or a simple
mechanism for random sharing among SUs without taking into
account the competition or coordination among SUs [7], [22].
However, a key challenge is how to share opportunities among
SUs to achieve a network-level objective. In this paper, some
sharing incentives among SUs are applied to avoid channel
degradation due to crowding effects. This coordination can
lead to higher network performance compared to when each
SU picks actions independently and competes randomly to
capture the channel.
To satisfy the imposed sharing constraints in a distributed
manner, a game-theoretic approach is studied and learning
algorithms, including best-response dynamics and log-linear
dynamics, are investigated to reach to the globally optimal so-
lution. In the spectrum sharing literature, there are a few works
studying log-linear dynamics to learn equilibrium points. For
instance, [23] studies log-linear equilibriums (or logit equilib-
riums) for a stochastic game and [24] presents a log-linear
learning algorithm for a strategic game with a unique pure-
strategy NE. However, in this paper, log-linear learning is
introduced and investigated for a strategic potential game
with multiple pure-strategy NEs aiming to enable equilibrium
selection.
Subsequently, with the aid of an adaptive CSMA scheme,
the fully-distributed learning-based access algorithm is pro-
posed in which each SU can locally and independently update
its own strategy. The proposed access algorithm distinguishes
this paper in coordinating spectrum access among SUs from
the previously proposed channel assignment schemes for SUs
with support of a central controller (e.g., [25]), exploiting a
common control channel (e.g., [26]) or a simple random access
(e.g., [5]).
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We study a cognitive radio network with Ns SUs looking
for temporal spectrum availabilities in Np frequency slots
(or channels), licensed to PUs. It should be noted that these
channels can be considered as narrowband subcarriers in a
multicarrier modulation scheme (e.g., OFDM). Each SU is
assumed to independently follow its own transmission time
frame that is simply divided into equal time intervals; each
interval of duration T has 2 phases: spectrum-sensing phase
of  followed by spectrum-access phase of (T   ). Although
each SU has the same values of T and  , time synchronization
is not necessarily required among different SUs since spectrum
sharing in each channel is based on a random-access scheme,
i.e., the adaptive CSMA scheme. In this paper, we assume suf-
ficiently accurate sensing with negligible PU miss-detection,
focusing on the effects of random PU returns. Perfect sensing
could be a sensible assumption in certain scenarios, e.g.,
applications in which SUs are located inside the service area
of the PU transmitter (e.g., [27]).
Let Na := f1; : : : ; Nag be the set of Na channels that
are detected idle in the spectrum-sensing, and hence, can be
utilized by Ns SUs and Cik be the channel quality function
for SU k in channel i. A simple example of the channel
quality is the transmission capacity represented by Cik =
Bilog(1 +P ikg
i
k;k=n
i
k) where B
i denotes the bandwidth, gik;k
3represents the channel power gain, P ik denotes the signal power
and nik represents the noise power for the SU k in the channel
i. Note that we assume block flat fading in which gik;k remains
unchanged during a given time-interval but independently
varies from one time-interval to another.
From the SU viewpoint, the PU activity in a given channel
can be modeled as a two-state continuous-time random process
with the OFF (0) and ON (1) states representing the idle
and busy periods of the PU. Hence, there will be a non-zero
probability of PU return (i.e., i) during a spectrum-access
phase to the channel i while it was detected idle by SUs in
the spectrum-sensing phase.
Regarding spectrum sharing, it is assumed that SUs share
idle channels using an adaptive CSMA approach. In the
proposed CSMA, each SU k enters a competition to access
an idle channel i 2 Na during a spectrum-access phase
with a certain probability (called intended activity factor),
ik(0  ik  1), to be determined based on channel qual-
ities, PU return probabilities and sharing incentives. Adaptive
activity factors enable prioritizing SUs who gain most from
using a channel, and hence, improving channel utilization in
comparison with a simple random access scheme. Note that
ik is restricted to a binary value in previous studies [5]–[7],
[19]–[21], such that ik = 0 expresses that the SU k does not
transmit in the channel i and ik = 1 represents that the SU k
transmits in the channel i for the entire spectrum-access phase.
Therefore, the proposed transmission scheme with 0  ik  1
generalizes the existing schemes.
More specifically, in the proposed CSMA scheme, each
spectrum-access phase is divided into S equal sub-slots with
length T S , labeled t1; : : : ; tS . For every sub-slot tj in chan-
nel i, the SU k performs the following steps:
1- Generate a Bernoulli random variable xik (tj) with success
probability ik to be determined. If x
i
k (tj) = 0, the SU k
will not transmit in subslot tj . If xik (tj) = 1, the SU k
will proceed to the next step.
2- Generate a back-off time ik (tj) according to a uniform
distribution in the interval (0; max).
3- After expiry of back-off time, sense the channel i, if it is
idle, transmit.
In the proposed CSMA scheme, one SU with the smallest
back-off time among the SUs who compete for the same sub-
slot (i.e., xik(tj) = 1) will succeed and transmit in this sub-
slot. Let yik(tj) be a binary random variable representing the
capturing status, i.e., yik(tj) = 1 if the SU k captures channel
i in sub-slot tj ; otherwise, yik(tj) = 0.
Assuming that each SU k keeps track of its capturing status
feedbacks, yik(tj), the achieved activity factor of SU k in the
channel i (i.e., the average time proportion of a spectrum-
access phase that a SU successfully occupies the channel i,
given the competition among SUs) is obtained as [15],
ik =
E
hPS
j=1 x
i
k(tj)y
i
k(tj)
i
S
(1)
Then,
ik = P

yik(tj) = 1; x
i
k(tj) = 1

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Fig. 1: Probability of getting the smallest back-off time vs. number
of SUs Ns
= ikP

yik(tj) = 1jxik(tj) = 1

(2)
where ik = P[x
i
k(tj) = 1] represents the intended activity
factor of SU k in the channel i. The probability of getting
the smallest back-off time to capture the channel is inversely
proportional to the number of SUs actively competing to
capture the same channel, i.e.,
P

yik(tj) = 1jxik(tj) = 1

= E
"
1
1 +
PNs
k=1;k 6=k x
i
k
(tj)
#
(3)
Applying the Jensen’s inequality, P[yik(tj) =
1jxik(tj) = 1]  11+PNsk=1;k 6=k ik . Figure 1 compares
F1 = E

1
1+
PNs
k=1;k 6=k x
i
k
(tj)

with the lower bound
F2 =
1
1+
PNs
k=1;k 6=k 
i
k
for different numbers of SUs (i.e.,
Ns). In this example, ik values are chosen randomly
according to the uniform distribution in the interval (0; 1).
Subsequently, xik is generated according to a Bernoulli random
variable with success probability equal to ik. It is shown
that the gap between the exact expected value in F1 and the
lower bound in F2 is very small, specifically for a larger
number of SUs. Thus, this approximation does not cause any
significant loss in terms of performance. Thus, in order to
find a closed-form expression, P[yik(tj) = 1jxik(tj) = 1] is
approximated with the lower-bound, i.e.,
ik '
ik
1 +
PNs
k=1;k 6=k 
i
k
(4)
The above expression indicates that the achieved activity
factor of each SU using the proposed CSMA scheme depends
on the intended activity factors of other SUs.
Since the SU k in channel i transmits partially with achieved
activity factor ik, its normalized transmission rate is 
i
kC
i
k.
Subsequently, the throughput of SU k in the idle channel i,
is defined as its successful transmission rate f ik = 
i
kC
i
k(1  
iki) where 
i
ki expresses the probability that the SU k
experiences transmission loss due to PU return in idle channel
4i (with probability i). Thus, due to the congestion nature of
channel contention, the throughput of each SU is dependent
on the activity factors of other SUs. To study the throughput
behavior of each SU with respect to other SUs’ actions, we
define sik =
PNs
k=1;k 6=k 
i
k
as a new parameter. Consequently,
f ik =
ikC
i
k
1+sik

1  iki
1+sik

where sik  0. Taking the derivative
of f ik with respect to s
i
k, we have
@f ik
@sik
=
ikC
i
k(2
i
ki   1  sik)
(1 + sik)
3
(5)
Based on (5), it is clear that f ik reaches its maximum value at
~sik = max(0; 2
i
ki   1). Since  1  2iki   1  1, it can
be concluded that optimal value of sik happens between 0 and
1, i.e., 0  ~sik  1. In other words, f ik is a decreasing function
of sik for s
i
k > 1. This means that the achievable throughput
of each individual SU decreases, while the contention among
SUs is increasing (for sik  1).
Thus, to control contention among SUs and achieve higher
throughput for each individual SU, we limit the sum of all
activity factors of different SUs in each idle channel i to one,
i.e.,
PNs
k=1 
i
k  1; i = 1; : : : ; Na. By keeping
PNs
k=1 
i
k 
1; i = 1; : : : ; Na, it can be guaranteed that sik  1; k =
1; : : : ; Ns; i = 1; : : : ; Na. Furthermore, the sum of all activity
factors of each SU k over all idle channels i = 1; : : : ; Na is set
equal to one, i.e.,
PNa
i=1 
i
k = 1. Generally, these constraints
enable us to preserve fairness among different SUs.
Aiming to determine the optimal activity factors, the op-
timization problem is formulated to maximize the overall
throughput of all SUs under constraints of
PNs
k=1 
i
k =
1; i = 1; : : : ; Na. However, to reduce computational com-
plexity, we set the utility function as U1 =
PNs
k=1
PNa
i=1 
i
k
Cik(1   iki) while keeping
PNs
k=1 
i
k  1, instead of
U2 =
PNs
k=1
PNa
i=1
ikC
i
k(1  iki). More specifically,
max

NsX
k=1
NaX
i=1
ikC
i
k
 
1  iki

(6a)
subject to
NsX
k=1
ik  1; i = 1; : : : ; Na (6b)
NaX
i=1
ik = 1; k = 1; : : : ; Ns (6c)
0  ik  1; i = 1; : : : ; Na; k = 1; : : : ; Ns (6d)
The formulated activity factor optimization problem is feasible
if Ns  Na. Note that this paper introduces the successful
transmission rate to establish the utility function of each SU
in each channel. However, most existing works, e.g., [5], [6],
[19]–[21], ignore the effects of random PU returns on the
SU transmission and the utility function of each SU in each
channel is defined as its transmission rate. Furthermore, in
previous studies, [5], [6], [19]–[21], the transmission rate of
each SU in each channel is simply defined as the channel
bandwidth assuming that number of bits delivered over a
channel in one time-slot is proportional to its bandwidth.
Instead, in this paper, we consider the channel quality function
which reflects channel conditions as well.
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In order to investigate the effect of choosing U1 along
with
PNs
k=1 
i
k  1 instead of U2 to find optimal activ-
ity factors, we plot the overall throughput of all SUs (i.e.,PNs
k=1
PNa
i=1
ikC
i
k(1   iki)) versus i and Ns for both
scenarios (i.e., using U1 and U2) in Figures 2 and 3. In
this example, we assume independent channels with the same
bandwidth Bi = 1 and same i. Please note that we used
exhaustive search to find the optimal activity factors while
optimizing U2. It is shown that the throughput improvement
by using U2 instead of U1 (along with
PNs
k=1 
i
k  1) to find
optimal activity factors is small. This fact can be explained
by the effective role of keeping
PNs
k=1 
i
k  1 to reduce
competition among SUs. On the other hand, using U2 makes
the optimization problem non-convex and computationally
complex. It is worth mentioning that we have studied the
activity factor allocation problem based on U2 in [28]. Since
the optimization problem is generally non-convex, the medium
access design is cast in a game theoretic framework. It is
shown that the NE of the formulated game can be highly
inefficient in terms of total profit for all SUs. However, by
setting the utility function as
PNs
k=1
PNa
i=1 
i
kC
i
k
 
1  iki

5while keeping
PNs
k=1 
i
k  1, in this paper, it will be shown
that the globally optimal solution is achievable through a fully-
distributed game-theoretic algorithm.
IV. GAME-THEORETIC DESIGN
In a highly dynamic environment such as cognitive radio
networks, it is practically essential to find a reasonably good
solution which can be obtained in a sufficiently fast manner. To
this end, in this section, the CSMA-based design is studied in
a game-theoretic framework which enables distributed imple-
mentation and fast convergence to a reasonably good solution.
More specifically, we consider a strategic non-cooperative
game in which the players are SUs.
According to the optimization problem in (6), each
SU could simply maximize its transmission rate (i.e.,PNa
i=1 
i
kC
i
k
 
1  iki

). However, SUs cannot select activity
factors which violate the coupling constraints in (6b). Since
it is difficult for SUs to identify feasible activity factors in
advance, we consider a penalty mechanism embedded in the
payoff function of each SU as a cost function. The penalty
mechanism is aimed to satisfy the coupling constraints among
different SUs in (6b) by severely punishing the SU who
violates each of them. Specifically, we focus on a linear
penalty mechanism. Thus, we construct an alternative payoff
function for SU k as
uk =
NaX
i=1
ikC
i
k
 
1  iki
  NaX
i=1
i
0@ NsX
j=1
ij   1
1A (7)
where (x) =
(
x; x > 0
0; x  0 and i is the penalty
factor in channel i which is a positive scalar. The sec-
ond term of (7) represents the penalty mechanism in the
payoff function of each SU. More specifically, we de-
fine the penalty in channel i as i(
PNs
k=1 
i
k   1) =(
i(
PNs
k=1 
i
k   1);
PNs
k=1 
i
k > 1
0;
PNs
k=1 
i
k  1
. In other words, on
one hand, SU k will not be penalized in channel i if ik is
chosen such that
PNs
k=1 
i
k  1. On the other hand, SU k has
to pay a penalty equal to i(
PNs
k=1 
i
k   1) if ik is chosen
such that
PNs
k=1 
i
k > 1. Note that SUs need to use the same
values of penalty factors, which can be easily set up during
initialization.
Let k =
h
1k; : : : ; 
Na
k
i
be the pure strategy at SU k and
 k be the pure strategy of all SUs excluding the SU k. A
pure strategy defines a specific action that a player can pick
from its own strategy set. Such actions are not drawn from
a probability distribution, as in the case of mixed strategies.
Subsequently, the admissible pure strategies of SU k is defined
as
Bk =
(
k : 
i
k 2 f0;
1
S
;
2
S
; : : : ; 1g; 8i 2 Na;
NaX
i=1
ik = 1
)
(8)
Note that ik takes discrete values in the proposed CSMA-
based algorithm. Then, we can define the non-cooperative
game for the medium access of SUs as
g = [Ns; fBkgk2Ns ; fukgk2Ns ] (9)
where Ns = f1; : : : ; Nsg is the set of players of the game (i.e.
SUs), Bk is the activity factor strategy set of the SU k and uk
is the corresponding payoff function of the SU k defined on
the set of pure-strategy profiles B = B1  : : : BNs .
An exact potential game is a strategic game in which
the incentive of all players to change their strategies can
be expressed in a global potential function. The potential
games are easy to analyze since improving each player’s utility
also increases the value of a potential function [29]. In the
following theorem, we demonstrate that the game G falls into
the framework of exact potential games.
Theorem 1: The formulated game G is an exact potential
game with the potential function,
 =
NsX
j=1
NaX
i=1
ijC
i
j(1  iji) 
NaX
i=1
i
0@NsX
j=1
ij   1
1A
(10)
Proof : It is clear that the game G satisfies the exact potential
game definition [29],
uk(k; k)  uk( 0k; k) = (k; k)  (
0
k; k);
8k; 0k 2 Bk; 8k 2 Ns (11)
Thus, G is an exact potential game and  is the potential
function of G. 
Conceptually, a strategic game can reach a steady-state Nash
Equilibrium (NE) point, if it exists, from which no player can
improve its utility by changing its own strategy unilaterally
[30]. In other words, a pure-strategy profile  = fkgNsk=1 2
B is a pure-strategy NE if and only if
uk(

k;

 k)  uk(
0
k;

 k); 8
0
k 2 Bk;8k 2 Ns (12)
We are interested to investigate the existence and characteris-
tics including the feasibility and efficiency of NE of the game
G.
A. Existence
First of all, the existence of NE of the game G is studied in
the following theorem based on the properties of the potential
games.
Theorem 2: The game G admits at least one pure-strategy
NE.
Proof : This theorem comes directly from Corollary 4 in
[31], which states every finite potential game G has at least
one pure-strategy NE. 
It should be noted that the payoff function of each SU
(i.e., uk) in (7) is not a continuous function over the strategy
set B. Thus, payoff functions are not strictly concave. As a
result, it cannot be concluded that the pure-strategy NE of the
formulated game G is always unique.
Remark 1: In general, the pure-strategy NE of game G may
not be unique.
6B. Feasibility
Since the optimization problem in (6) has the coupling
constraints in (6b) which are merged in the payoff functions in
the formulated game G, it is required to verify if an arbitrary
pure-strategy NE is feasible, i.e., satisfying the constraintsPNs
k=1 
i
k  1; i = 1; : : : ; Na. Thus, the following theorem
presents conditions that assure the feasibility of pure-strategy
NEs.
Theorem 3: All pure-strategy NEs of the game G must be
feasible if
i > th;8i 2 Na (13)
where
th = max
k2Ns;k2Bk
 
S
NaX
i=1
ikC
i
k
 
1  iki
!
(14)
Proof : See Appendix A for the proof.
Theorem 3 assures that, by properly designing i’s, the
payoff functions in (7) can guarantee the feasibility of the
steady states of the system.
C. Efficiency
The other aspect that we are interested to study is how
efficient the NE of game G is in comparison with the globally
optimal solution of (6). In other words, NE efficiency is
measured comparing to the globally optimal solution of (6).
The following theorem specifies the relationship between the
globally optimal solution and the NE of the game G.
Theorem 4: The globally optimal solution of (6) is the
Pareto-optimal pure-strategy NE of G if i > th; 8i 2 Na.
Proof : See Appendix B for the proof.
Theorem 4 shows that the globally optimal solution con-
stitutes a pure-strategy NE. From Theorem 4, it follows that
the NE must be the globally optimal solution when the NE is
unique. However, when multiple NEs exist in the formulated
game G, a randomly chosen NE may not be the globally
optimal solution. That is why we need to study different
learning algorithms to find an iterative algorithm which can
guarantee convergence to the most efficient NE (i.e., the
globally optimal solution).
Remark 2: In the next section, learning-based iterative al-
gorithms are proposed which enable the convergence to the
globally optimal pure-strategy NE.
V. LEARNING EQUILIBRIA
Assuming that the rationality of players and the structure
of the game are common knowledge, equilibrium can be
observed as a result of analysis and introspection of the
players. Otherwise, under assumption of bounded rationality or
partial information, equilibrium may arise as a consequence of
a long-run learning process. In this section, aiming to achieve
an equilibrium of the game G, learning approaches are dis-
cussed in terms of information requirements and convergence
properties.
A. Best-Response Dynamics
To reach an equilibrium of the game G, first, a simple learn-
ing algorithm for activity factor selection is presented, based
on the asynchronous best-response dynamics. In particular,
at each time t 2 f0; 1; 2; : : :g, exactly one SU k 2 Ns, is
randomly selected to revise its activity factors based on the
best-response dynamics defined as
k[t] = arg max

0
k2Bk
uk(
0
k; k[t  1]) (15)
Under perfect knowledge of current strategies of other SUs
(i.e.,  k[t   1]), the convergence of the proposed game-
theoretic algorithm is established in the following theorem.
Theorem 5: The learning algorithm under asynchronous
best-response dynamics converges with probability of one to
a pure-strategy NE of the game G from any initial strategy
point.
Proof : Based on Theorem 19 in [30], in a finite exact
potential game, best-response dynamics will converge with
probability of one to a pure-strategy NE in finite steps. Accord-
ingly, in game G, the best-response iterations will converge to
a pure-strategy NE. 
To verify convergence of the best-response dynamics, a
numerical result is also provided. In this example, we assume
independent channels with the same bandwidth Bi = 1 and the
same i. We set the similar SNR =
P ik
nik
= 10dB for individual
SUs. Furthermore, we assume Ns = 3, Na = 3 and i = 0:1.
Note that we use the same example for all simulation results.
Figure 4 demonstrates the convergence process of the ac-
tivity factors of three SUs in the first idle licensed channel
for a certain channel realization. All SUs start by setting
their initial values of their activity factors to zero. In each
iteration, they sequentially play to optimize their own payoff
functions, and update their activity factors based on the best-
response dynamics in (15) (e.g., in the following order: SU3,
SU2, SU1). Note that each SU updates its activity factors in
three different channels simultaneously. However, due to the
limited space, the simulation results for only channel 1 are
demonstrated.
In iterations 1, SU3 then SU2 then SU1 play and obtain
13 [1] = 0:5, 
1
2 [1] = 0:33, and 
1
1 [1] = 0:53, which result
in
P3
k=1 
1
k  1. In iteration 2, SU3 is penalized for this
excessive amount, and, for its specific channel realization,
Figure 4 indicates that the SU 3 is forced to reduce its activity
factor to 13 [2] = 0:14 in order to keep
P3
k=1 
1
k  1.
Subsequently, SU2 and SU1 do not need to change their
strategies, and maintain 12 [2] = 0:33, and 
1
1 [2] = 0:53. From
iteration 3, since
P3
k=1 
1
k  1; i = 1; : : : ; 3, SUs actually
optimize their own throughput, i.e., their own payoff functions
become uk =
P3
i=1 
i
kC
i
k
 
1  iki

. Thus, their strategies
do not change any more. Note that, for different channel
realizations, it is possible that all SUs change their activity
factors to satisfy
PNs
k=1 
i
k  1 in iteration 2. Furthermore,
the process of reducing
PNs
k=1 
i
k may take more than two
iterations. Additionally, Figure 5 shows the convergence of
potential function. As evident from Figures 4 and 5, in less
than 10 iterations, activity factor selection converges to a NE
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which is not essentially the globally optimal solution. Note
that each iteration corresponds to a complete update by all the
SUs.
According to Theorem 5, the best-response iterations will
converge to a pure-strategy NE which is not necessarily the
globally optimal solution of (6). Since NE could be highly
inefficient with regards to the network-level objective, it is
thus crucial to find a learning process to reach the globally
optimal solution.
B. Log-Linear Dynamics
Since the basic myopic best-response dynamics suffer from
multiple rest points (e.g., any pure-strategy NE), it is essential
to introduce a learning process that can select an appropriate
equilibrium. Aiming to enable equilibrium selection, the log-
linear learning has been proposed as a perturbed best-response
process which guarantees convergence to the most efficient
NE for potential games [17], [18]. The basic idea behind
the equilibrium selection in log-linear learning is to introduce
noise into decision making process which enables categorizing
equilibria based on their stability characteristics. This noise
allows players to select suboptimal actions (i.e., non-best
responses) with a certain probability which is attached with
the magnitude of the payoff difference of the best response
and the suboptimal action.
In the log-linear learning, SUs are assumed to be myopic
and boundedly rational. At each time t > 0, exactly one SU
k 2 Ns is randomly selected to update its action, using a
probability distribution over its strategy set in response to the
current strategy profile. Let k be the player chosen at time t
to revise its action. Then, SU k will choose action k given
the current strategy profile  k[t 1] with a probability based
on the log-linear choice rule
kk [t] =
e
1
uk(k; k[t 1])
 0k2Bke
1
uk(
0
k; k[t 1])
(16)
where 0 < 1 < 1. The scalar 1 can be interpreted as
the level of rationality of the SUs. In other words,  shows
the level of noise in the SUs’ decisions and determines how
often SUs choose their best responses. The described rule
is called log-linear since the log-likelihood ratio of selecting
between two actions is linearly proportional to the difference
of corresponding payoffs, given other SUs’ actions [32]. As
 ! 0, the log-linear rule approaches to the best-response
rule. However, the SU k will choose any action k 2 Bk with
equal probability as  ! 1. Thus, for any 0 <  < 1, SUs
explore non-best responses with non-zero probabilities which
are exponentially smaller for actions yielding smaller payoffs
[17], [18].
Our goal is to characterize the long-run behavior of asyn-
chronous log-linear learning process for game G. To this end,
the log-linear dynamic adjustment process is represented as an
irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain fXt gt2N on the set of
strategy profiles of the game [17], [18]. Subsequently, based
on the study in [17], the stationary distribution, i.e., limiting
distribution in a Markov chain, is studied to explain the long-
run behavior of this update rule. Accordingly, the stationary
distribution of asynchronous log-linear learning process in
game G is presented as
() =
e
1
()P
2B e
1
()
(17)
According to (17), () (i.e., the probability that Xt = 
for sufficiently large times t > 0) can be expressed as
an explicit function of the potential function. A strategy
profile  = fkgNsk=1 is said to be stochastically stable if
lim!0 () > 0. Consequently, the stochastically stable
strategy can be computed based on (17).
Corollary 1: In game G, the only stochastically stable strat-
egy profile of asynchronous log-linear learning process is the
maximizer of potential function  which is the NE of the
potential game G based on Theorem 2 in [29]. Assuming
i > th; 8i 2 Na, the globally optimal solution of (6) is
equal to the maximizer of the potential function. As a result,
the globally optimal solution of (6) is the only stochastically
stable NE.
The importance of this Corollary–which comes directly from
Corollary 1 in [17] for exact potential games–is two-fold,
i.e., convergence and equilibrium selection. In particular, this
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explains that the log-linear learning converges, in probability,
to the NE, which is the potential function maximizer (and
also equal to the globally optimal solution in the formulated
game G assuming i > th; 8i 2 Na) with sufficiently large
rationality level. In other words, by properly designing the
rationality level, log-linear dynamics will ultimately converge
to the globally optimal NE in game G.
To verify the convergence properties of log-linear learning,
Figures 6 and 7 show the convergence process of the activity
factors of three SUs in the first idle licensed channel for a
certain channel realization and the convergence of the po-
tential function, respectively. They confirm that the log-linear
iterations lead to the globally optimal solution despite the best-
response dynamics. As can be observed, it takes merely around
20 iterations to quickly converge to the globally optimal
solution. The other aspect which affects the practicality of a
learning process is the convergence speed. From Proposition
152 in [33], assuming i > th, the convergence time of
the log-linear learning to be -close to the globally optimal
solution is in the order of
Ns log log(Ns) + log

1


(18)
for any initial condition if the rationality level (i.e., 1 ) is
sufficiently large. According to (18), the convergence time is
linearly proportional to the number of SUs using the log-linear
learning in game G.
Note that, in the proposed adaptive CSMA scheme, a player
(SU) updates its strategy for its iterative learning algorithm
(using best-response or log-linear dynamics) after a successful
transmission and does not need any coordination with other
SUs.
Considering the proposed best-response dynamics and log-
linear dynamics, each SU (e.g., SU k) needs the sum of
current activity factors of all other SUs in each channel (i.e.,
sik[t] =
PNs
k=1;k 6=k 
i
k
[t 1]; i = 1; : : : ; Na) to update its own
strategy. Up to this point, we assume that SU k can obtain
sik[t] accurately, with the aid of a central coordinator or an
information exchange between SUs, i.e., SU k has perfect
knowledge of sik[t]; i = 1; : : : ; Na.
In the next section, to relief the need for frequent infor-
mation exchange in the proposed learning algorithms, an al-
ternative algorithm has been proposed based on best-response
dynamics using locally available information. In the proposed
algorithm, SU k estimates sik[t] based on the CSMA feed-
backs. Since this estimation with limited samples suffers from
random errors, each SU would have only noisy estimation of
sik[t] in the proposed algorithm. Then, considering such noisy
information, convergence of the proposed iterative algorithm
following best-response dynamics is studied. Since each SU
can locally and independently update its own strategy without
any information exchange among SUs, this proposed iterative
algorithm can be implemented in a distributed manner.
VI. BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS WITH NOISY
OBSERVATIONS
In [15], we study how to use the capturing status feedbacks
of CSMA scheme, yik(tj), to estimate the sum of activity
factors of all SUs in each channel. It is shown that i =PNs
k=1 
i
k can be updated after each window of S
0
sub-slots
as ^i ' ik +

S
0
:ikPf+S0
l=f+1 y
i
k(tl)

  1. Since estimation with
a limited number of samples suffers from random errors, it
is shown that ^i = i + w where E[w] and var[w] are of
O

(S
0
) 1

[15].
From (7), it is clear that the estimation noise of i will
cause a bias (i.e., b = max(0; w)) in uk, and hence, best-
response iterations in (15) will also involve random errors.
Since the first derivative of uk is finite, the bias and variance
of the random noise in best-response iterations should be also
of O

(S
0
) 1

.
As shown in log-linear learning, adding noise to the de-
cision making process enables equilibrium selection taking
advantage of the fact that the globally optimal NE is the only
stochastically stable NE in potential games. Accordingly, in
Theorem 3 of [34], it is shown that a bounded noise will
asymptotically ensure the convergence of the best-response
iterations to a neighborhood of the globally optimal solution in
potential games. That is because suboptimal NE points are less
stable than the globally optimal NE (i.e., global optimum) in a
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sense that a small noise can cause the best-response iterations
diverge from the suboptimal NE while moving in the direction
toward the globally optimal NE.
Similarly, in the proposed algorithm, best-response itera-
tions involve errors although they are random with bounded
bias and variance. With a sufficiently large or increasing
estimation window (i.e., S
0
), the random noise can be ap-
proximated as a bounded noise. Therefore, it is expected that
the best-response iterations converge to the global optimum.
Mathematically, this can be presented as the following claim.
Claim 1: 8" > 0, an estimation window size can be
selected (i.e., 9S0 > 0) such that
limt!1 inf ( [t])  max   " with probability of 1.
This claim declares that, by properly designing an estima-
tion window size (i.e., S
0
), best-response iterations can get
arbitrarily close to the globally optimal solution of (6) which is
also the maximizer of the potential function (i.e., ), assuming
i > th; 8i 2 Na.
To confirm convergence of noisy best-response iterations
to the globally optimal solution, Figure 8 demonstrates the
convergence process of the activity factors of three SUs in
the first idle licensed channel. In addition, the convergence
process based on the proposed learning-based non-game-
theoretic algorithm in [15] is illustrated in Figure 8. It is clear
that the game-theoretic algorithm accelerate the convergence in
comparison with the algorithm proposed in [15]. Furthermore,
Figure 9 shows the convergence of the potential function.
They confirm that the best-response iterations will stay in a
neighborhood of the global optimum.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, using a potential game model, we developed
a distributed adaptive CSMA-based access design in which
activity factors of SUs over multiple idle channels are adap-
tively adjusted. Via potential game framework, it is established
that the formulated game admits at least one pure-strategy NE.
In consideration of coupled constraints among SUs, sufficient
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conditions are presented to assure the feasibility of pure-
strategy NEs. In addition, it is proved that the globally optimal
solution is the Pareto-optimal NE.
Furthermore, the convergence properties of the best-
response dynamics and log-linear dynamics of the formulated
game are investigated. Assuming perfect knowledge of moves
previously made by all SUs, it is proved that best-response
iterations converge to a pure-strategy NE which is not essen-
tially the globally optimal solution. However, the log-linear
process enables equilibrium refinement and convergence to the
most socially desirable solution. Subsequently, in a game with
noisy observations, it is shown that best-response iterations
also converge with probability of one to a neighborhood of
the global optimum.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 3
Suppose that  = fkgNsk=1, where k 2 Bk, is a pure-
strategy NE of game G, but it is not feasible, i.e., it violates
at least one of the constraints in (6b). Further, suppose that m
is the index of channel which has the most severe violation,
i.e.,m = argmaxi2Na
PNs
j=1 
i
j   1

. Thus,
PNs
j=1 
m
j > 1.
Considering k 2 Ns such that mk > 0, from (7), we have
uk(k; k) =
NaX
i=1
ikC
i
k
 
1  iki
  m
0@ NsX
j=1
mj   1
1A
 
NaX
i=1;i6=m
i
0@ NsX
j=1
ij   1
1A (19)
Assuming that
PNs
j=1 
m
j = 1 +  where  6= 0, there
must exist a channel n such that
PNs
j=1 
n
j  max(0; 1   )
since Na  Ns. Then, an alternative admissible strategy
~k =
h
~ik
i
i2Na
2 Bk can be constructed such that ~ik =8><>:
ik; i 6= m;n
ik   ; i = m
ik + ; i = n
where  is a non-zero discrete
10
value (i.e.,  2 f 1S ; 2S ; : : : ; 1g) satisfying   min(1; ),
0  mk    1 and 0  nk+  1. Note that
PNs
j=1
~nj  1 
1 since   min(1; ), and hence, 
PNs
j=1
~nj   1

=

PNs
j=1 
n
j   1

. Then, uk

~k; k

can be obtained as
uk(~k; k) =
NaX
i=1
~ikC
i
k(1  ~iki) 
NaX
i=1
i
0@ NsX
j=1
~ij   1
1A
=
NaX
i=1
~ikC
i
k(1  ~iki)  m
0@ NsX
j=1
mj   1  
1A
 
NaX
i=1;i 6=m
i
0@ NsX
j=1
ij   1
1A (20)
Thus, from (19) and (20),
uk(k; k)  uk(~k; k) =
NaX
i=1
ikC
i
k
 
1  iki
 
NaX
i=1
~ikC
i
k(1  ~iki)  m
0@ NsX
j=1
mj   1
1A
+ m
0@ NsX
j=1
mj   1  
1A (21)
Since   , we have
m
0@ NsX
j=1
mj   1  
1A  m
0@ NsX
j=1
mj   1
1A
= m(  )  m   m (22)
Subsequently, from (21) and (22),
uk(k; k)  uk(~k; k) 
NaX
i=1
ikC
i
k
 
1  iki
  NaX
i=1
~ikC
i
k(1  ~iki)  m (23)
Under assumption of i > th; 8i 2 Na, from (14), we have
m > S
NaX
i=1
ikC
i
k
 
1  iki

(24)
Since   1S , from (24), it can be concluded that
NaX
i=1
ikC
i
k
 
1  iki
  m < 0 (25)
Thus, based on (23) and (25),
uk(k; k)  uk(~k; k)  0 (26)
This contradicts the assumption that  = fkgNsk=1 is a pure-
strategy NE of game G according to the definition of NE in
(12). Thus,  is not a pure-strategy NE of G. Hence, it can
be concluded that all pure-strategy NE must be feasible if
i > th; 8i 2 Na. 
B. Proof of Theorem 4
Let assume that  = fkgNsk=1 is the optimal solution of
(6). Assuming i > th; 8i 2 Na,  is the maximizer of
the potential function . Based on Theorem 2 in [29], the
maximizer of the potential function is the NE of the potential
game. Hence,  is the NE of the game G.
Subsequently, we need to establish that  is the Pareto-
optimal NE. Let assume that  is not Pareto optimal, and
then, there exists an arbitrary strategy profile 
0
= f 0kgNsk=1
such that
uk(
0
k;
0
 k)  uk(k; k); 8k 2 Ns; k 6= j (27)
and, for some j,
uj(
0
j ;
0
 j) > uj(j ; j) (28)
As a result,
NsX
k=1
uk(
0
) >
NsX
k=1
uk() (29)
Since  is a NE of the game G, it is feasible based on Theorem
3 (i.e.,
PNa
i=1 i
PNs
j=1 
i
j   1

= 0). Then,
() =
NsX
k=1
uk() (30)
Furthermore, considering that i’s are positive scalars, from
(7) and (10), for an arbitrary 
0
, we have
(
0
) 
NsX
k=1
uk(
0
) (31)
Consequently, based on (29), (30) and (31),
(
0
) > () (32)
This contradicts the fact that  is the maximzer of the potential
function . Thus, the optimal solution of (6) is the Pareto-
optimal pure-strategy NE of the game G. 
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